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THE MEANING OF PATTERN IN RICO
DONALD J. MORAN*
In Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Ithe Supreme Court rejected two
judicially created restrictions 2 that would have nullified the civil provi-
sions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO"). 3 Sedima has been generally viewed as signalling the Court's
disapproval of judicially fashioned limitations on civil RICO, and as es-
tablishing the basis for broad construction of the statute in accord with
its remedial purposes. This view is inaccurate. Noting in Sedima that
the "extraordinary" uses to which civil RICO has been put is attributable
to "the failure of Congress and the courts to develop a meaningful con-
cept of 'pattern' ,,,4 the Court invited district and appellate courts to for-
mulate such a concept. In so doing, however, the Court has provided no
clear and consistent guidelines, thus leaving hostile judges free to fashion
new limitations on civil RICO now that the old ones have been rejected.
At least one district court has enthusiastically accepted the Supreme
Court's invitation. In Northern Trust Bank/O'Hare v. Inryco, Inc.,' a
district judge for the Northern District of Illinois held that two mailings
made in connection with a single construction contract kickback scheme
failed to establish the requisite pattern of racketeering activity. 6 Stating
* Partner, Pedersen & Houpt, P.C., Chicago, Illinois; B.A. 1973, Northwestern University;
J.D. and M.R.P. 1977, Syracuse University.
1. 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
2. These restrictions, which were borne of a pervasive judicial hostility to the scope of the
statute, required a prior criminal conviction and a racketeering-type injury before a civil RICO
action could be maintained. For a thorough discussion of the manifestation of judicial hostility to
civil RICO, see Moran, Pleading a Civil Rico Action Under Section 1962(c): Conflicting Precedent
and the Practitioner's Dilemma, 57 TEMP. L.Q. 731 (1984).
3. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982). RICO is Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970 ("OCCA"), Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified and amended in various sections
of 18 and 28 U.S.C.).
4. "Pattern of racketeering activity" is the operative phrase used in RICO. Such a pattern
"requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of
this chapter [October 15, 1970] and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any
period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity." 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(5) (1982).
5. 615 F. Supp. 828 (N.D. Il. 1985).
6. Id. at 833. In dictum, the court observed that even if three additional kickback payments
involved use of the mails, this would still implement the same fraudulent scheme as the first two
mailings. Id. The court noted that because a single scheme does not establish a pattern, amending
the complaint by alleging these additional kickbacks would still fail to overcome the insufficiency of
the RICO complaint. Id. On the authority of Inryco, the court also dismissed a civil RICO com-
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that Sedima "creates a whole new ballgame, ' ' 7 the court found that a
pattern requires "repeated criminal activity, not merely repeated acts to
carry out the same criminal activity."'8 Based upon its reading of
Sedima, the court declined to follow well-established Seventh Circuit
precedent 9, which holds that acts conducted in furtherance of a single
criminal activity or scheme are sufficient to satisfy the "pattern"
requirement. 10
This article will reexamine the pattern requirement in light of
Sedima. It will propose a meaning to be applied by the courts that com-
ports with RICO's text, its underlying policies, and the Congressional
mandate that the statute be liberally construed to achieve its remedial
purposes.
I. THE STATUTE
A. Operative Terms of RICO
The key terms in RICO are "person", "enterprise" and "pattern of
racketeering activity." In essence, RICO prohibits a person from invest-
ing, acquiring an interest or participating in an enterprise through a pat-
tern of racketeering activity.
A "person" is defined as "any individual or entity capable of holding
a legal or beneficial interest in property."" A person would therefore
include individuals, corporations, associations and partnerships. An "en-
terprise" is defined as "any individual, partnership, corporation, associa-
tion, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals
plaint in Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 615 F. Supp. 836 (N.D. Ill. 1985), finding there was no
repeated criminal activity sufficient to form a pattern. Id. at 837-38.
7. Northern Trust Bank, 615 F. Supp. at 833.
8. Id. at 831.
9. Id. at 833.
10. United States v. Starnes, 644 F.2d 673, 678 (7th Cir.), cert. den. 454 U.S. 826 (1981);
United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595, 601-02 (7th Cir. 1978). Other circuits have similarly
construed the pattern requirement. See United States v. Watchmaker, 761 F.2d 1459, 1475 (11th
Cir. 1985) (shooting of three policemen at clubhouse constituted three predicate acts sufficient for
RICO violation); United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1038 (5th Cir. 1981) (predicate acts neces-
sary for finding a pattern of racketeering must be two separate crimes but need not be in the context
of independent schemes or objectives); United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 441-42 (2d Cir. 1974)
(two acts of interstate transportation of stolen property sufficient to constitute a pattern of racketeer-
ing). Moreover, in a decision handed down after both Sedima and Inryco, the Seventh Circuit has
reaffirmed its holding that separate mailings in furtherance of a single scheme to defraud are suffi-
cient to constitute a pattern of racketeering activity under RICO. I1. Dept. of Revenue v. Phillips,
771 F.2d 312, 313 (7th Cir. 1985); see also Ray v. Karris, 780 F.2d 636, 644-45 (7th Cir. 1985) (in
reversing trial court's dismissal of RICO action and allowing plaintiffs to replead, court of appeals
suggests that single fraudulent scheme can constitute pattern of racketeering activity.)
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1982).
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associated in fact although not a legal entity.' 1 2 Thus, an enterprise
would include both legal entities and de facto associations of persons.13
Unlike person and enterprise, "pattern of racketeering activity" is
not so neatly described. The statute speaks in terms of the minimum, but
not necessarily the sufficient, standards to establish a "pattern." The
statute states that a pattern of racketeering activity "requires at least two
acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective
date of this chapter [October 15, 1970] and the last of which occurred
within two years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the com-
mission of a prior act of racketeering activity." 14 Racketeering activity is
defined as a specific "act" or "offense" which is chargeable or indictable
under certain state or federal laws. 15 The word "pattern" is not sepa-
rately defined.
The substantive prohibitions of RICO are found in section 1962.
Section 1962(a) makes it unlawful for any person to use or invest any
income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity in acquiring, es-
tablishing or operating any enterprise. 16 Section 1962(b) prohibits any
person from acquiring or maintaining any interest or control of any en-
terprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. 17 The most widely
invoked provision, section 1962(c), prohibits any person employed by or
12. Id. § 1961(4).
13. An enterprise has been held to include legitimate business entities, United States v. Hartley,
678 F.2d 961, 989-90 (11th Cir. 1982); labor unions, United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 52 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981); state civil courts, United States v. Angelilli, 660 F.2d 23 (2d
Cir. 1981); sole proprietorships, McCullough v. Suter, 757 F.2d 142, 143-44 (7th Cir. 1985); groups
of individuals and corporations associated in fact, United States v. Aimone, 715 F.2d 822, 828 (3d
Cir. 1983); and law firms, United States v. Jannotti, 729 F.2d 213, 226 (3d Cir. 1984).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982).
15. Id. § 1961(1).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) reads as follows:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly
or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful
debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of section 2,
title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such in-
come, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment
or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, inter-
state or foreign commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of
investment, and without the intention of controlling or participating in the control of the
issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the
securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his
or their accomplices in any pattern or racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful
debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding
securities of any one class, and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one
of more directors of the issuer.
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) reads as follows:
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any
interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce.
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associated with any enterprise from conducting or participating in the
enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.' 8 Section
1962(d) prohibits any person from conspiring to violate any of these
three substantive provisions.' 9 RICO, then, does not prohibit merely the
commission of a pattern of racketeering activity, but, rather, the commis-
sion of such a pattern in connection with an enterprise.
If any person is injured in his business or property as a result of this
conduct, RICO provides a remedy in the form of a civil cause of action
for treble damages and attorneys' fees.20 This private right of action is
independent of any criminal prosecution the Government might bring
regarding the same conduct under section 1963.
B. The Statutory Purpose
In enacting RICO, Congress found that "organized crime activities
... weaken the stability of the Nation's economic system, harm innocent
investors and competing organizations, interfere with free competition,
seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce, threaten the domestic
security and undermine the general welfare of the Nation and its citi-
zens."' 21 Because of defects in the evidence-gathering process and be-
cause the available remedies were "unnecessarily limited in scope and
impact", RICO provided "enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal
with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime."'22
Congress, however, did not limit RICO's prohibitions to those who
were members of organized crime. As both a legal and practical matter,
Congress could not sufficiently define organized crime.23 Moreover, rec-
ognizing its role as developing comprehensive solutions to identified
problems, Congress was unable to draft "an effective statute which
reaches most of the commercial activities of organized crime, yet does
not include offenses commonly committed by persons outside organized
crime as well."'24 Congress, therefore, targeted a person's conduct, not
18. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) reads as follows:
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pat-
tern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) reads as follows:
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of
subsections (a), (b) or (c) of this section.
20. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
21. OCCA, 84 Stat. 923 (1970).
22. Id.
23. See 116 Cong. Rec. 35,204 (1970) (statement of Rep. McClory).
24. Id. at 18,940 (statement of Sen. McClellan). See also McClellan, The Organized Crime Act
(S. 30) or Its Critics: Which Threatens Civil Liberties?, 46 Notre Dame Law. 55, 142-43 (1970) ("The
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his association, as the object of RICO's prohibitions. That conduct in-
cludes participating in an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activity.
The purpose of RICO is remedial rather than penal.25 It intended to
provide "enhanced sanctions and new remedies" against the infiltration
of legitimate business by organized criminal activity,26 and to enable per-
sons who suffer injury as a result of this conduct to bring a civil action
for damages. 27 The primary aim, therefore, is to compensate victims and
deter the commission of RICO offenses, not to punish offenders. 28 Vic-
tims include innocent investors, competing organizations and the Na-
tion's citizens. 29  The remedial purposes are most evident in section
1964(c), 30 which provides a treble damages recovery for "(a)ny person
injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section
1962 .... "31
C. The Liberal Construction Clause
Congress has expressly declared that RICO is to "be liberally con-
strued to effectuate its remedial purposes."' 32 This mandate should only
be followed, however, when the words of the statute are ambiguous; lib-
eral construction is unnecessary when the statutory language is clear. 33
Senate report does not claim, however, that the listed offenses are committed primarily by members
of organized crime, only that those offenses are characteristic of organized crime. The listed offenses
lend themselves to organized commercial exploitation, unlike some other offenses such as rape, and
experience has shown they are commonly committed by participants in organized crime. That is all
the title IX list of offenses purports to be, that is all the Senate report claims it to be, and that is all it
should be") (Emphasis by the Senator). See also Hearings Before Sub-comm. No. 5 of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, on S. 30 and Related Proposals, Relating to the Control of Organized Crime
in the United States, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 689 (1970) ("Organized criminals who injure business
today do not look like stereotyped criminals. They are executives and technicians. Their forte is
manipulation of computer information, tampering with accounting procedures, theft of trade secrets
and invasion of confidential company files").
25. See S. Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 82 (1969). The conclusion of Congress has not
subsequently changed. See S. Rep. No. 307, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1273 (1981) (purpose of treble
damage civil recovery in RICO "is remedial, not penal; adequate relief or compensation is the main
goal").
26. 84 Stat. 923; 116 Cong. Rec. 602 (1970); See also United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576,
591 (1981).
27. See 116 Cong. Rec. 602 (1970) (statement of Sen. Haruska) (principal value of Title IX
"may well be found to exist in its civil provisions"); see also Organized Crime Control, Hearings on S.
30 and Related Proposals Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on The Judiciary, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) at 146-49, 520 (statement of Cong. Biaggi and Cong. Steiger).
28. See S. Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 81-82.
29. 84 Stat. 923.
30. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
31. Id.
32. 84 Stat. 947 (1970).
33. See Note, RICO and the Liberal Construction Clause, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 167, 170-71
(1980).
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As previously mentioned, the conduct proscribed in section 1964(c) in-
cludes conducting or participating in an enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity.34 If there is any ambiguity in construing an ele-
ment of the proscribed conduct which gives rise to a private right of
action under section 1964(c), the liberal construction clause should be
applied. If the term "pattern of racketeering activity" is deemed ambigu-
ous, it should be liberally construed to promote RICO's remedial
purposes.
II. THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE
In construing RICO, one must look first to its language. 35 If that
language is unambiguous, it must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive,
absent any clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary. 36 The
term "pattern of racketeering activity" is ambiguous because it is not
completely defined in the statute. While "racketeering activity" is specif-
ically defined, the word "pattern" is not. Pattern is susceptible to various
meanings. Herein lies the difficulty in construing the statutory language.
"Racketeering activity" is defined as any one of a number of acts
that are chargeable or indictable under state or federal law.37 Therefore,
one racketeering activity is defined as a single act which is itself a crime
or offense subjecting the perpetrator to prosecution. There is nothing
explicit or implicit in the statutory language to suggest that a racketeer-
ing activity need consist of anything more than a single, isolated criminal
act.
A person, however, cannot be held liable for engaging in racketeer-
ing activity-he must engage in a pattern of racketeering activity. RICO
does not define what is meant by pattern, but instead only states what a
pattern requires. 38 Pattern "requires at least two acts of racketeering ac-
tivity .... ,,39 This language establishes a quantitative, not a qualitative,
requirement. More significantly, the language "at least" suggests that
while this quantitative standard is required in determining whether a pat-
tern exists, it may not be sufficient.
Pattern is formally defined as a "grouping or distribution." 4° It is
also defined as a "definite direction, tendency, or characteristic", such as
34. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
35. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981).
36. Id.
37. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).
39. Id.
40. Webster's Dictionary of the English Language, Unabridged.
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a behavior pattern.41 In the context of section 1961(5), pattern may thus
be viewed as a "grouping" of racketeering activity that possesses a defi-
nite purpose or definite characteristic. "Group" is defined as "a number
of persons or things gathered closely together and forming a recognizable
unit."' 42 The word "number" means "the sum of any collection of per-
sons or things."'43 Two persons are the sum of each one of them, and
hence two persons are sufficient to form a "number" and a "group." The
formal definition, therefore, contains no requirement that a pattern con-
tain a minimum number, beyond two, of persons or things.
The definition also suggests the element of relationship, which con-
nects the persons or things by common characteristics or goals so as to
form a recognizable arrangement. The commonly understood meaning
of pattern is not so easily identified. Certainly it includes the principle of
relationship between or among the things in the group. However, as the
Supreme Court has pointed out in Sedima, "in common parlance two of
anything do not generally form a 'pattern'." 44 Similarly, one district
court has stated that a pattern "connotes a multiplicity of events."'45 Yet
no one has attempted to determine at what number a group of acts or
things become a pattern. There appears to be no logical or pragmatically
compelling basis for the position that four acts constitute a pattern, but
two or three do not. In practical terms, a pattern can be perceived in two
acts as well as in four. For example, if a person commits two acts of
murder by strangling his victims with a garden hose, has not a pattern
been established? Would two additional murders by the same method
(thereby bringing the total to four) make the four acts any more, or the
two acts any less, a pattern? It would seem not. Notwithstanding this
conclusion, the widely held belief that a pattern consists of something
more than two acts or events persists. We shall now consider whether
the legislative history furnishes any clarification.
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The legislative discussion involving the pattern requirement re-
flected a greater concern with the concept of relationship than with
number. No definitive answer is furnished to the question of how many
acts are necessary to constitute a pattern. The legislative history does




44. Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
45. Northern Trust Bank/O'Hare v. Inryco, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 828, 831 (N.D. Il1. 1985).
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that relationship is therefore an essential component of pattern.46
The report of the Senate Judiciary Committee provides the most ex-
tended consideration of the pattern concept:
The concept of "pattern" is essential to the operation of the statute.
One isolated "racketeering activity" was thought insufficient to trigger
the remedies provided ... largely because the net would be too large
and the remedies disproportionate to the gravity of the offense. The
target of title IX is thus not sporadic activity. The infiltration of legiti-
mate business normally requires more than one "racketeering activity"
and the threat of continuing activity to be effective. It is this factor of
continuity plus relationship. which combines to produce a pattern.
47
After quoting this portion of the Report Senator McClellan, the sponsor
of the Senate bill, stated that "[t]he term 'pattern' itself requires the
showing of a relationship ... so, therefore, proof of two acts of racketeer-
ing, without more, does not establish a pattern. . . ." (emphasis added)
48
Representative Poff, a sponsor of the bill in the House, stated that a pat-
tern of racketeering activity means "at least two independent offenses
forming a pattern of conduct," and that RICO was "not aimed at the
isolated offender."' 49 He also stated that a " 'pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity' means simply two or more acts of racketeering activity, one of
which.., must have occurred subsequent to enactment of the title." 50
At no point does the legislative history establish that two acts are
sufficient to form the requisite pattern. On the other hand, based upon
Senator McClellan's statements, it is not clear whether ten, fifteen or
twenty acts, without more, would be sufficient to constitute a pattern. 51
In short, Congress' principal concern was not with the number of acts
sufficient to establish a pattern, but with their relationship. 52 Concerning
the question of number, the legislative history and statutory language are
46. S. Rep. No. 91-617, at 158 (1969).
47. Id.
48. 116 Cong. Rec. 18940 (1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan). In a subsequent law review
article, Senator McClellan affirmed these statements in writing that "commission of two or more acts
of racketeering activity is made a necessary, but not a sufficient, element of a pattern under Title
IX .... The term 'pattern' itself requires the showing of a relationship .... " McClellan, The
Organized Crime Act (5.30) or Its Critics: Which Threatens Civil Liberties, 46 Notre Dame Law.
55,144 (1970).
49. 116 Cong. Rec. 35193 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff).
50. Id. at 35295.
51. See supra note 48.
52. Congress was also concerned with "continuity." S. Rep. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
at 158 (1969). Beyond its statement that the infiltration of legitimate business normally requires
more than one racketeering act and "the threat of continuing activity," Congress did not explain
what it meant by continuity. For example, is the required continuity satisfied by a mere succession
or series of acts within the context of a single scheme, so that a single scheme consisting of two or
more acts is sufficiently continuous? On the other hand, does this continuity require separate crimi-
nal activities or schemes directed against different victims? Or does it require only a "threat" of
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precisely consistent: "at least two acts" are required.5 3 This standard
recognizes that a pattern could consist of any sum between two and, the-
oretically, an infinite number of acts. It is not the number, standing
alone, which creates a pattern. It is, rather, the concept of relationship
which is the something "more" that imparts to the individual acts their
recognizable form or pattern.
Congress, however, failed to define the nature and scope of the rela-
tionship necessary to establish a pattern. In stating that it is the "factor
of continuity plus relationship which combines to produce a pattern," 54
Congress did not explain its terms. Congress did not, for example, con-
sider whether two or more acts committed in furtherance of a single
scheme would be sufficiently related and continuous. 55 Similarly, it did
not explain whether these acts had to be separate in time and place and,
if so, to what extent.
Moreover, Congress did not address whether the necessary relation-
ship required a connection between or among the predicate acts, or be-
tween the acts and the enterprise, or both. The fact that Congress
explicitly stated that RICO was not aimed at "sporadic activity" suggests
that a required relationship between the predicate acts was intended. On
the other hand, the emphasis on the enterprise as a key concept in the
statutory scheme56 suggests that isolated acts, unrelated to each other
but initiated and directed by the enterprise, would be sufficient to form a
pattern. The question whether a pattern requires two criminal episodes
or schemes, separate in time and place, and each consisting of at least
two predicate acts, is simply not addressed.
Notwithstanding these unanswered issues, the legislative history
clearly establishes the following points:
(1) A pattern may consist of two predicate acts;
further activity? The formal definition states that continuity is an "[u]ninterrupted connection, suc-
cession or union." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary.
It is unlikely that Congress intended the word to have such a strict meaning, for infiltration and
other criminal schemes can be perpetrated in distinct and separate activities as well as in a coherent
and continuous scheme. Continuity should not be construed so strictly as to permit persons who
conduct single criminal schemes to escape civil RICO liability. If the predicate acts further a single
scheme, they comprise a series or succession of acts sufficiently continuous in the context of that
scheme. Requiring continuity through distinct criminal schemes or activities would unnecessarily
restrict RICO by excluding from its provisions the victim of a scheme that is continuing and injuri-
ous, but also singular. Continuity, therefore, should be viewed as an element of the required rela-
tionship between or among the predicate acts, not as an independent standard requiring multiple
schemes. See infra notes 64-78 and accompanying text.
53. See supra notes 14 and 48.
54. S. Rep. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969).
55. See supra note 52.
56. See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
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(2) two or more predicate acts are a necessary, but not a sufficient,
condition to establish a pattern;
(3) in addition to the predicate acts, a relationship must be demon-
strated before a pattern is established.
These three points are consistent with the text of RICO. Neither the text
nor the legislative history, however, adequately defines the type of rela-
tionship which is an essential element of pattern.
IV. DEVELOPING THE MEANING OF PATTERN
In common understanding, the word pattern means a grouping of
qualities or acts forming a consistent or characteristic arrangement.
5 7
This meaning implies a relationship between the qualities or acts that are
reflected in common characteristics or shared goals. While the formal
definition does not require more than two acts to establish a pattern,
common usage generally deems a pattern to consist of something greater
than two acts.
The text of RICO and its legislative history resolve this ambiguity
concerning number by declaring that "at least two acts" are required to
form a pattern.5 8 The required relationship of these acts, implied by the
common understanding and confirmed by the legislative history, is not
specified. This relationship will, therefore, be developed on the basis of
the purposes and policy considerations underlying RICO.
RICO was primarily intended to combat the deleterious effects on
the nation's economy caused by organized criminal activity. 59 Because
of the legal and practical difficulties in limiting RICO's prohibitions to
those linked with organized crime, Congress focused on conduct, not as-
sociation, as the basis for imposing liability under the statute.6° RICO
was expressly intended to provide "enhanced sanctions and new remedies
to deal with" this unlawful conduct. 61 Where ambiguities existed, the
statute was "to be liberally construed to effectuate" these remedial
purposes.
62
The criminal activity addressed by RICO is set forth in section
196 l(1).63 This activity includes arson, bribery, and mail, wire and se-
curities fraud. These acts frequently occur in the context of a scheme or
57. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text; see also United States v. White, 386 F. Supp.
882, 883 (E.D. Wisc. 1974).
58. See supra notes 14 and 48.
59. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
60. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
61. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
62. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
63. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982).
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plan. The scheme may consist of one or a number of acts intended to
further or achieve specific goals. When there is more than one, the acts
may form a pattern. The common feature characterizing this pattern is
generally the goal or purpose of the scheme. Hence, the acts constituting
the pattern are related by this shared goal. For example, a scheme to
commit arson involves a number of acts designed to bring about the de-
struction of a building or other structure through burning. The scheme
may consist of the single act of setting the fire, or it might include such
additional acts as travelling across state lines to set the fire, using the
mails to defraud the insurer and kidnapping. 64 Similarly, a scheme to
commit mail fraud might involve a single use of the mails designed to
deprive one of money or property, or it might involve numerous mailings
to achieve its purpose.65 When there is more than one act comprising the
scheme, such acts66 are connected with each other, at a minimum, by the
goal or objective of the scheme.
These acts will also be related in time and place. The acts could be
carried out and completed in the same place on the same day, or they
could occur in different places over a longer period of time. Regardless
of where and when they took place, the acts would be related because of
the shared goal or purpose of the scheme, and would be continuous be-
cause they constituted a series of acts within the structure of the scheme.
The fact that acts which further a shared criminal goal may be commit-
ted in the same place and on the same day does not detract from the
nature or purpose of the underlying scheme.67 There is no logical or
practical reason to differentiate between a single scheme whose predicate
acts are committed within a day and one whose predicate acts are com-
mitted over some longer period of time. If the criminal ends of both
schemes have been achieved, and innocent persons harmed, the evil
which the statute seeks to address has occurred, and the perpetrators of
64. See United States v. Starnes, 644 F.2d 673 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 826 (1981)
(RICO conviction affirmed for single scheme of arson involving interstate travel to commit the arson
and use of the mails to defraud insurer); United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49 (D. Conn. 1975)
(although both occurred in a single criminal episode on the same day, acts of kidnapping and arson
constituted pattern). Cf United States v. Salvitti, 451 F. Supp. 195, 199-200 (E.D. Pa.), afTd, 588
F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1978) (single scheme of bribery, consisting of paying and fraudulently using the
mails, constituted pattern).
65. Illinois Dept. of Rev. v. Phillips, 771 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1985).
66. The acts may all involve mail fraud, or they may include bribery, mail and wire fraud or
other criminal actions set forth in section 1961(1).
67. See United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49, 58 (1975) (pattern can be established "by two
acts occurring on the same day in the same place and forming part of the same criminal episode
.... ) For the contrary view, see Teleprompter of Eric, Inc. v. City of Eric, 537 F. Supp. 6, 12-13
(W.D. Pa. 1981) (receipt of numerous bribes in same location on same day insufficient to form
pattern).
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the former scheme should not be allowed to escape application of RICO
simply because their acts were short and swift.
A single scheme, therefore, may consist of a pattern of discrete acts
related by a common goal, irrespective of whether those acts are sepa-
rated in time and place or occur in different criminal episodes. Indeed,
RICO was designed to combat any scheme that causes injury to business
or property. Such a scheme, when it involves arson, certainly tends to
weaken the stability of the Nation's economic system, harms competing
organizations and threatens the domestic security.68 Similarly, a mail
fraud scheme whose target is a federal governmental agency 69 seriously
burdens interstate commerce and tends to undermine the economic sys-
tem and the general welfare of the Nation. Provided that they consist of
at least two acts of racketeering that are committed in connection with
the operation of an enterprise, single schemes that cause the type of harm
for which Congress expressed great concern should be subjected to
RICO's sanctions. The fact that the acts committed in furtherance of the
scheme do not occur in different criminal episodes or events, separate in
time and place, is insufficient to conclude that a single scheme, consisting
of a number of predicate acts related by a common purpose, cannot con-
stitute a pattern under RICO. It would frustrate the purpose of the stat-
ute to allow a person to insulate himself from RICO liability merely by
committing criminal acts in the context of single, but unrelated, criminal
schemes, or by perpetrating and completing such schemes in the same
place on the same day.
The relationship necessary to establish a pattern, therefore, does not
include any spatial or temporal relationship between or among the predi-
cate acts. The required relationship is reflected, instead, in the connec-
tion of the acts to the goal or purpose of the scheme. This relationship
not only comports well with the practical realities involved in the perpe-
tration of a criminal scheme, but it also takes into account the Congres-
sional intent that RICO not be directed to isolated or unrelated instances
of prohibited behavior.
The inquiry does not, however, end here. As previously noted,
RICO does not prohibit the commission of a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity.70 Rather, the statute prohibits conducting or participating in an
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. 7I This raises the
question whether the acts, in addition to their interrelationship through a
68. See supra note 21.
69. United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1978).
70. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
71. Id.
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common goal or objective, must also be related to the enterprise. More
importantly, it raises the question whether the existence of a relationship
between the acts and enterprise itself is sufficient to establish a pattern.
It appears fundamental that the predicate acts should in some way
relate to the enterprise. On its face, the statute prohibits acting upon an
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. 72 Merely engaging
in a pattern of racketeering activity is not proscribed. In addition, there
is nothing in the legislative history to suggest to the contrary. To allow a
RICO action to be brought on the basis of predicate acts which bear no
relation to the enterprise would subvert the statutory language by nullify-
ing the enterprise element.
The type of relationship required depends upon whether the enter-
prise is the victim, tool or perpetrator of the pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity.73 As victim, the enterprise will suffer harm as a direct or indirect
result of the predicate acts. As tool, the enterprise will serve as a front or
instrument through which the predicate acts are carried out. As perpe-
trator, the enterprise will initiate, supervise or sponsor the predicate acts.
That the predicate acts should bear some relation to the enterprise
does not answer the question whether that relationship is sufficient to
establish a pattern. Put another way, the issue is whether both a relation-
ship between the predicate acts and between the acts and the enterprise
are required to establish a pattern, or whether the existence of either of
those relationships would be sufficient. As previously noted, statutory
language and legislative history provide little guidance. Because the
structure of the statute places significant emphasis on the interplay of the
enterprise and pattern of racketeering activity, a relationship between the
acts and the enterprise is a sine qua non for the finding of a pattern. If
the acts are unrelated to an enterprise, it is difficult to perceive how a
RICO violation could be charged without ignoring the statutory frame-
work. Similarly, that framework strongly suggests that a RICO plaintiff
must in some way be victimized by a pattern of racketeering activity, 74
not by "sporadic" or "isolated" acts. The pattern of racketeering acts
will frequently reflect or establish a criminal scheme or schemes. This
does not mean, however, that all predicate acts must be related, but only
that at least two should be sufficiently related to form a scheme or crimi-
nal activity which results in injury.
72. Id.
73. For a discussion of these various roles played by the enterprise, see Moran, Pleading a Civil
RICO Action Under Section 1962(c): Conflicting Precedent and the Practitioner's Dilemma, 57
Temp. L.Q. 731, 771-79 (1984).
74. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a), (b), (c) (1982).
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The "sporadic activity" or "isolated acts" 75 which have been de-
clared inappropriate RICO targets would include a single predicate act
or a number of predicate acts, no two of which are related both to the
same enterprise and to the alleged injury. Multiple schemes or activities
are not necessary to preclude an act from being characterized as "spo-
radic" or "isolated." If, for example, two or more acts are part of a
single scheme that are carried out through an enterprise and cause in-
jury, these acts are not "sporadic" or "isolated." They are, in fact, the
constituent elements of the scheme. The acts are continuous in the con-
text of the scheme and are related in the sense that they are intended to
further its objectives or goals. The acts define, and are in turn defined by,
the nature and objectives of the scheme. They are, therefore, related to
each other and to the scheme, and cannot be said to be "sporadic" or
"isolated." Logic does not require that other schemes or criminal activi-
ties be perpetrated so that these acts can be found to be sufficiently re-
lated and continuous.
If, a predicate act in no way causes or contributes to the injury that
civil RICO is intended to redress, it would seem illogical to permit that
act to be bootstrapped with another to state a cause of action under the
statute. Civil RICO is available to those who have suffered injury to
their business or property by reason of the conduct of a pattern of racke-
teering activity in connection with an enterprise. 76 The pattern, i.e., its
predicate acts, should in some way cause or contribute to the injury the
plaintiff has suffered. Otherwise, a civil RICO plaintiff could allege as an
essential element of the cause of action predicate acts bearing no relation
to his injury, and no relevance to the critical issue of damages. Yet, as
prerequisites for establishing the pattern, these acts would still have to be
proved. Such a result would appear to contravene logic, common sense
and the efficient administration of justice. If, however, these acts were
perpetrated in similar schemes by or through the same enterprise against
different victims, there is no legal or logical reason to preclude one victim
from establishing the requisite pattern by alleging acts, reflecting the
same modus operandi directed toward other victims. 77 Thus, acts are
75. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
76. See supra note 71.
77. See Papagiannis v. Pontikis, 108 F.R.D. 177, 179 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (perpetration of fraudu-
lent activities on more than one victim, following the same modus operandi can be a pattern). In
criminal RICO, when separate individual acts may be directed against different victims over a long
period of time under the auspices of a single enterprise, the relationship of the predicate acts to the
enterprise may be sufficient to form a pattern. See United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 889 (5th
Cir. 1978). Practical as well as policy considerations support this conclusion. Where a series of
separate and unrelated schemes are directed by an enterprise as perpetrator, it would be anomalous
to say that a pattern could not be established because the separate schemes or acts were not related
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not "sporadic" or "isolated" if at least two of them relate to the enter-
prise and to the scheme, or modus operandi, and at least one of them
relates to the alleged injury.
In sum, the statutory pattern is properly defined as a grouping of
two or more racketeering acts that bear some relation to an enterprise. A
single scheme can constitute a pattern, provided there are at least two
racketeering acts committed in furtherance of the scheme that are also
related to an enterprise. A pattern is thus appropriately found where two
or more racketeering acts related to an enterprise have the same or simi-
lar purposes, results, participants, victims or methods of commission.
78
As they are not supported by the text, legislative history or policy of
RICO, multiple criminal activities or schemes, each consisting of numer-
ous acts of racketeering activity, should not be required to establish a
pattern.
V. JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE PATTERN REQUIREMENT IN
THE WAKE OF SEDIMA
The dictum in Sedima inviting lower courts to develop a meaningful
concept of "pattern" unfortunately provided minimal guidance as to how
this development should be accomplished. 79 While focusing on the lan-
guage in Sedima that "two isolated acts of racketeering activity do not
constitute a pattern", 80 certain courts have concluded that at least two
related acts of racketeering activity are sufficient to form a pattern.81
Other courts, however, have read that dictum as authority for venturing
beyond the text, legislative history and policy of RICO to create new
to each other, though they were clearly related to the enterprise. To require a relationship between
the acts would enable persons to insulate themselves from RICO liability by planning their criminal
designs in distinct and unrelated single act schemes aimed at different victims. Congress, having
unequivocally expressed its desire to curb the inimical effects of organized criminal activity, surely
did not intend, in its discussion of the relationship concept, to preclude RICO actions for separate
yet continuing criminal schemes carried on by or against enterprises. To construe such a loophole
would undermine the remedial purposes of the statute and ignore the mandate that it be liberally
construed to effectuate those purposes.
78. See Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Industries, Inc., 770 F.2d 717, 718 n.l (8th Cir.
1985) (similar purposes, results, participants, victims and methods bespeak a sufficient "continuity
plus relationship" to avoid targeting sporadic activity); see also Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP.
L.Q. 1009, 1030 (1980).
79. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
80. Id. at 3285 n.14.
81. Bank of America v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d 966, 971 (1lth Cir. 1986); R.A.G.S.
Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1350, 1355 (5th Cir. 1985); Trak Microcomputer Corp. v. Weare
Bros., No. 84 C 7970, slip op. at 14 (N.D. II1. Oct. 25, 1985); Conan Properties, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc.,
619 F. Supp. 1167 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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restrictions on its application in the civil context.82
Foremost among jurists adopting this approach is District Judge
Milton Shadur of the Northern District of Illinois. In Northern Trust
Bank/O'Hare v. Inryco,8 3 Judge Shadur declared that "pattern" requires
not only a relationship between the predicate acts, but also a series of
separate criminal activities or schemes.8 4 According to Judge Shadur, a
single scheme, consisting of numerous predicate acts, would not consti-
tute the necessary pattern of racketeering activity.8 5
Inryco involved a construction kickback scheme. Plaintiff con-
tracted with Inryco for the construction of a warehouse addition.8 6 In-
ryco assigned one of its employees, Mr. Ranke, as project manager.
87
His duties included soliciting bids and awarding subcontracts. 88 Inryco
and the project manager hired Century Construction Company to act as
concrete subcontractor.8 9 The project manager then arranged a kickback
scheme in which he would issue a phony work order to Century in a
certain amount. 90 Inryco paid the amount to Century, but the work was
never done.9 1 Century subsequently paid a kickback by check to the
project manager under an alias.92 The project manager received four
payments totalling almost $265,000.
93
In charging Inryco with violating civil RICO, plaintiff alleged that
Century performed its concrete work in an unworkmanlike manner, and
that the project manager was responsible for the defects because he either
failed to supervise the work or knowingly permitted Century to perform
in an unsatisfactory manner.9 4 Inryco moved to dismiss the RICO ac-
tion on a number of grounds, including the contention that Inryco was
improperly named as a defendant because it was itself a victim of the
82. Fleet Management Systems, Inc. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., No. 83-3060, slip op.
(C.D. Ill. January 28, 1986); Kredietbank v. Joyce Morris, Inc., No. 84-1903, slip op. (D.N.J. Janu-
ary 9, 1986); Lipin Enterprises v. Lee, No. 84 C 7762, slip op. at 6-7 (N.D. Ill. September 11, 1985).
Professional Assets Management Inc. v. Penn Square Bank, 616 F. Supp. 1418 (W.D. Okla. 1985);
Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 615 F. Supp. 836 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Northern Trust Bank/O'Hare v.
Inryco, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 828 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
83. 615 F. Supp. 828 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
84. Id. at 831-33.
85. Id. at 833.
86. Id. at 829.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 829-30.






fraud. 95 The insufficiency of the pattern requirement was not argued in
the motion. The court raised the issue sua sponte.96
The court began its analysis with a brief review of the precedents
construing the pattern requirement.97 The court concluded that control-
ling Seventh Circuit precedent, which held that acts taken in furtherance
of a single scheme are sufficient to constitute a pattern, were "only partly
right in fleshing out the concept of 'pattern'."98 The more complete an-
swer was that the word "pattern" connotes "a multiplicity of events." 99
The continuity inherent in the word "presumes repeated criminal activ-
ity, not merely repeated acts to carry out the same criminal activity."' 1
For the court, the common understanding of "pattern" include not only
two or more acts, but also two or more criminal schemes or activities. 101
This understanding, the court stated, is supported by the language in the
Senate Report, quoted in Sedima, that it is the factor of "continuity plus
relationship which combines to produce a pattern."' 10 2 Based upon the
connotation of multiplicity, the court concluded that the statutory "pat-
tern" requires two or more criminal schemes or activities.103
The fundamental problem with the court's approach is its disregard
of the statutory language and its concomitant creation of a restrictive
definition that undermines the remedial purposes of RICO. Section 1962
prohibits a "person" from becoming involved in an "enterprise" as a re-
sult of or through a "pattern of racketeering activity." 1° 4 Racketeering
activity is defined as an act, specifically, as any one of a number of enu-
merated state or federal offenses.105 The phrase a "pattern of racketeer-
ing activity" is thus properly read as a pattern of "acts", not a pattern of
"schemes" or "activities." The statute makes clear that the pattern "re-
quires at least two acts . .. .- 1o6 The Inryco court, however, ignores the
statutory definition of racketeering activity and, drawing upon its finding
that "pattern" connotes "a multiplicity of events", rewrites the phrase
"pattern of racketeering activity" as a "pattern of multiple or repeated
criminal activity". This construction would require not only a relation-
95. Id.
96. Id.





102. Id. at 832-33.
103. Id. at 833.
104. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982).
105. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).
106. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
ship among the predicate acts within a scheme and between the scheme
and the enterprise, but it would also require multiple schemes. 107 Noth-
ing in the text of RICO supports this requirement of multiple schemes.
The language says "at least two acts of racketeering activity.. .", not "at
least two criminal schemes or episodes."
Moreover, such a requirement finds no warrant in the pragmatic
and policy considerations underlying the statute. Criminal conduct, the
type which Congress targeted in enacting RICO, may frequently be car-
ried out in single schemes. To illustrate, one effective way to defeat a
competitor is to destroy his business. If the business is a grocery or laun-
dromat, a single scheme of arson will normally suffice. The scheme itself
might consist of nothing more than making an interstate phone call to
contract the job and setting the fire. The two predicate acts necessary to
satisfy the statutory "pattern" have taken place. The scheme is certainly
the type of conduct Congress had in mind when it enacted RICO to com-
bat activities that "harm innocent investors and competing organiza-
tions, interfere with free competition . . . [and] threatens the domestic
security ..... 10 Under Inryco, however, this scheme, even if it were
comprised of ten or more predicate acts, would not come within RICO's
ambit because it would not amount to "repeated criminal activity", but
would merely reflect "repeated acts to carry out the same criminal activ-
ity."' 10 9 The victim of the arson would be unable to bring civil RICO
action unless the perpetrators engaged in another scheme.' 10 Creative
criminal minds can readily devise broad but singular schemes or activi-
ties which encompass numerous and repeated acts taken in furtherance
of that single scheme. Inryco would enable persons to insulate them-
selves from RICO liability by shaping their acts to fit a single scheme.I'I
Inryco would also insulate from RICO persons engaging in a series
107. This requirement is found in the concept of "continuity." National Trust Bank/O'Hare v.
Inryco, 615 F. Supp. 828, 831, 833 (N.D. Ill. 1985). See also Allington v. Carpenter, 619 F. Supp.
474, 478 (D. Cal. 1985) (to establish continuity, predicate acts must occur in different criminal
episodes). But see Graham v. Slaughter, 624, F. Supp. 222, 225 (N.D. IlI. 1985 (continuity requires
more than a single transaction or episode but not necessarily more than a single scheme). For a
discussion of the term "continuity," see supra note 52.
108. See supra note 21.
109. Northern Trust Bank/O'Hare v. Inryco, 615 F. Supp. 828, 831, 833 (N.D. IIl. 1985).
110. It is not clear whether Inryco would require this additional scheme to be directed against
the same victim. Under the analysis developed in the text, two single act schemes with different
victims perpetrated by or through the same enterprise would suffice to form the requisite pattern. It
is unlikely that the Inryco court would reach the same conclusion.
111. For example, a scheme to defraud the XYZ Insurance Company might involve numerous
acts of arson and mail fraud. Under Inryco, if these numerous acts of arson and mail fraud were
merely repeated acts to carry out the same criminal activity (i.e., scheme to defraud the XYZ Com-
pany), there could be no recovery under RICO.
PATTERN IN RICO
of single act schemes. Persons involved or participating in an enterprise
may devise separate and myriad schemes directed against different vic-
tims which consist only of single acts of arson, bribery, or mail, wire and
securities fraud. Under Inryco, these multiple schemes would not estab-
lish a pattern because the acts would not be sufficiently related to each
other. 112 Each would be viewed as a "single criminal transaction."1 3 By
planning diverse and unrelated single act schemes against different vic-
tims, a person could avoid a finding of "pattern" and RICO liability pur-
suant to Inryco.
The remedial purposes of RICO are undermined when victims can-
not obtain compensation because they have not been the target of multi-
ple schemes. A single scheme, consisting of at least two predicate acts
connected by a shared goal, is sufficient. RICO was intended to provide
"enhanced sanctions and new remedies" to combat and deter certain
types of criminal conduct. By creating new restrictions upon the form
this conduct must take, the Inryco court has not only ignored the man-
date that RICO be liberally construed, but it also has, in effect, frustrated
those remedial purposes.
Notwithstanding the Inryco court's observations to the contrary, the
Supreme Court opinion in Sedima does not require this result. The
Court noted that two "isolated" acts do not constitute a pattern.
114 It
later stated that "the compensable injury necessarily is the harm caused
by predicate acts sufficiently related to constitute a pattern .... 11115
There is no hint or suggestion that two "related" acts, related in the
sense that they share a common purpose, plan or scheme would not suf-
fice to establish a pattern. Indeed, the Court's strong emphasis on the
directive that RICO is to be broadly construed 1 6 belies such a
conclusion.
There may have been grounds on which Inryco could have been
properly dismissed as a RICO defendant.1 '7 The fact that multiple crim-
inal schemes or activities did not occur was not one of them. Such a
requirement ignores the text and policy of RICO. In addition, it frus-
112. Of course, if the series of single act schemes involved the same type of conduct and objec-
tives, such as in the cases of arson for profit and land sales fraud, the requisite relatedness, and thus
the pattern, would likely be found. See Inryco, 615 F. Supp. 828, 831 (N.D. Ill. 1985); see also
Papagiannis v. Pontikis, 108 F.R.D. 177, 179 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
113. Id. at 832.
114. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
115. Id. at 3286.
116. Id.
117. Interestingly, the Inryco court itself refers to other possible grounds for dismissal, most
persuasively the fact that Inryco appeared to be the principal victim, rather than the perpetrator, of
the fraud. Inryco, 615 F. Supp. at 835.
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trates the statute's remedial purposes by preventing victims of racketeer-
ing acts from invoking RICO to obtain compensation for injuries to their
business or property." I 8
CONCLUSION
Pattern is one of the key concepts in the statutory framework of
RICO. It is not, however, clearly defined. If the ordinary meaning of the
word is somewhat ambiguous, the proper approach is not to shape re-
stricting definitions which tend to undermine the broadly drawn Con-
gressional goals. Rather, courts should develop a meaning that furthers
these goals.
By its decision in Sedima, the Supreme Court invited the judiciary
to develop a meaningful definition of "pattern". Implicit in the Court's
invitation is the belief that such a definition might curb the "extraordi-
nary" uses to which civil RICO has been put. The Court did not, how-
ever, provide specific principles to guide this effort or to resolve the
tension between the concern with the extraordinary uses of the statute
and its liberal construction clause. The absence of such principles en-
ables courts that are ideologically hostile to RICO to impose new restric-
tions on the statute that thwart or undermine its remedial purposes.
This article has developed a meaning of pattern, based upon the
text, legislative history and policy that accommodates the statute's reme-
dial purposes. A pattern consists of two or more predicate acts which are
related to the enterprise and to each other, as part of a single scheme
which causes injury. Requiring multiple schemes or activities completely
separated in time and place to establish a pattern are judicial creations
which find no support in the text or policy of RICO. Adoption of these
definitional requirements would preclude the application of RICO to a
significant category of conduct the statute was designed to combat. Ex-
amples of such conduct include the single criminal schemes involving
arson, bribery or mail fraud that causes injury to a person's business or
property. If these persons, whether they are innocent investors, compet-
ing organizations or hardworking citizens, cannot invoke RICO the re-
medial purposes of the statute are frustrated.
118. Fleet Management Systems v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. No. 83-3060, slip op. at 20
(C.D. Il1. January 28, 1986) (single fraudulent scheme, consisting of at least eight separate instances
of mail and wire fraud over a period of more than two years, was insufficient to establish pattern);
see, e.g., Professional Assets Management v. Penn Square Bank, 616 F. Supp. 1418, 1422-23 (W.D.
Okla. 1985) (following Inryco, court holds that single scheme by accounting firm consisting of multi-
ple wire or telephone communications intended to disseminate false information regarding bank was
insufficient to form pattern).
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The proper use of civil RICO has been the subject of widespread and
heated debate. Hostility to its use against "legitimate" businesses has
been pronounced. Proposals to clarify or redefine certain critical provi-
sions of the statute, including "pattern", have been made by Congress1 19
and others. 120 Such proposals are properly directed to and considered by
the Congress, not the courts. RICO was broadly drawn, and Congress
has commanded that it be similarly construed. The ambiguity in pattern
should be construed liberally, as Congress has directed, so that the stat-
ute's remedial purposes are promoted. For courts to do otherwise, by
restrictively interpreting pattern, would both usurp the legislative func-
tion and deny an explicit legislative mandate.
119. H.R. 2517, 99th Congress, 1st Sess.
120. REPORT OF THE AD Hoc CIVIL RICO TASK FORCE OF THE ABA SECTION OF CORPORA-
TION, BANKING AND BUSINESS LAW (1985).

